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Baltic State Membership in the European Union:
Developing a Common Asylum and Immigration
Policy
AMY L. ELSON'
INTRODUCTION

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, collectively known as the Baltic States,
have experienced numerous political and social changes since their secession
from the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1991. As member states
of the USSR, the Baltic States were dominated by Soviet policy.' With
secession came the much desired opportunity for the Baltic States to return to
their former independent status. This ongoing transition, although long
awaited and hoped for, has not occurred without difficulty. In addition to the
enormous challenge of integrating themselves into the economic world, the
Baltic States must integrate and establish themselves in the world political
regime as well. In order to facilitate this process, each of the three states hopes
to become a member of the European Union (EU).
The EU recently expanded its membership to include Sweden, Austria, and
Finland.2 This expansionary mode is expected to continue as the next phase,
an eastern enlargement of the EU, occurs. EU leaders have agreed to the
eventual admission of all those Central and Eastern European nations with
which they currently have Europe Agreements.' Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
have also applied for EU membership. Although the EU has not yet granted
membership to any of the three Baltic States, all are currently slated to become
member states in the early years of the next century." The EU has formerly

*
J.D., 1998, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A., summa cum laude, 1995,
Indiana University.

1. Whether Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were, in fact, incorporated into the USSR is a subject of
debate. The United States never formally acknowledged the USSR's 1940 incorporation of the Baltic States.
2. Richard Baldwin et al., Iniroductio in EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION I, 4

(Richard Baldwin et al. eds., 1995).
3. Id

4. Because it has a more advanced economy, Estonia is likely to become the first of the Baltic States
to gain full membership to the EU. Lithuania and Latvia, with their slightly less developed economies, are
expected to be granted membership shortly thereafter.
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recognized both the economic and political importance of the Baltic States and
has developed a schedule for their incorporation.'
In order to prepare for their eventual membership in the European Union,
the Baltic States must make numerous adjustments. All three states must
continue to put forth a great deal of effort to prepare their economies for
interaction with the economies of EU countries. Furthermore, the Baltic States
must bring their foreign policy in line with that of the.EU. One of the most
important policy areas that will have to be aligned with current EU policy is
immigration and asylum policy.
This note examines how the current immigration and asylum policies of
the Baltic States must be modified so that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can
become full member states during the next wave of EU enlargement. Part I
provides a brief history of the Baltic region, from medieval times through the
region's secession from the USSR in 1991. Part II discusses the proposed
membership of the Baltic States in the EU and the existing and emerging
immigration and asylum policies of the European Union. Part III examines the
actions the Baltic States must take in order to align their policies with those of
the EU and whether the alignment of these policies will potentially violate the
constitutions of these new states.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BALTIC STATES
The history of the Baltic States has been marked by periods of
independence as well as by periods of control by other nations. It reflects the
diverse and turbulent events that have shaped the region. An examination of
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian history provides an important perspective
for the analysis of the developing immigration and asylum policies of these
three countries. Examination of the ethnic composition of the Baltic States,
both from historical and current perspectives, also provides information
relevant to the current status of immigration and asylum policies in these three
countries.

5.

BULL. EuR. UNION 10-1994, 1.3.21 [hereinafter BULLETIN].
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A. The Baltic States Priorto Russian Incorporation
The geographic location of the Baltic States has played a major role in the
development of the region's history. The three Baltic States comprise a
unified geographic area 6 that is bordered to the west by the Baltic Sea, the east
by Russia and Belarus, and the south by Poland. From the end of the twelfth
century, the Baltic region was primarily ruled by a succession of invading
powers.7 Estonia and parts of Latvia were at times controlled by foreign
powers such as Germany, Denmark, and Sweden." Lithuania, however, fared
quite differently from her Baltic counterparts. The Lithuanian kingdom
dominated the region from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea during the medieval
era, 9 and the kingdom formed a commonwealth with Poland, her neighbor to
the south.'
This period of Lithuanian power, however, was not destined to last. In the
eighteenth century, Russia conquered the Baltic Region." Peter the Great won
Livland and Estland from the Swedes and, in 1772, Catherine II acquired
Latgale through the First Partition of Poland. 2 Russia completed her conquest
of the Baltic Region in 1795; the Third Partition of Poland brought the
provinces of Vilna, Kovno, and Grodno, as well as the Duchy of Kurland, into
the Russian Empire. 3 Through these conquests, Russia brought most of the
Baltic peoples within the bounds of her empire.'4 Despite this annexation, the
Baltic territories retained a great deal of local autonomy."' This autonomy,

6. Andrea J. Hanneman, Note, Independence and Group Rights in the Baltics: A Double Minority
Problem, 35 VA. J. INTL. L. 485, 487 (1995).
7. Id. at 487-88.
8. Id. at 488. The nations of Estonia and Latvia as we know them today did not exist at this time.
The use of these names is intended to provide reference to the geographic region only. Prior to the
eighteenth-century incorporation of the Baltic region into the Russian Empire, "neither an 'Estonia' nor a
'Latvia' existed or ever had existed; and only Lithuania had experienced independent statehood." James
D. White, Nationalism and Socialism in HistoricalPerspective, in THE BALTIC STATES: THE NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LTHUANIA

13,13 (Graham Smith ed., 1994).

9. Graham Smith, Introduction: The Baltic Nations and NationalSelf-Determination,in THE BALTIC
STATES: THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LrrHuANIA,

supra note 8, at 1,

2.
10. Hanneman, supra note 6, at 488.
11. Id.
12. White, supra note 8, at 13.
13. Id. Estland and the northern part of Livland were occupied by the Estonians, and the Latvians
inhabited the southern portions of Livland, Kurland, and Latgale. Lithuanians occupied Vilna, Kovno, and
Grodno. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 14.
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however, did not create a sense of national identity; the majority of ethnic
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were peasant farmers who remained
6
cultural aliens to the Baltic nobility.
It was not until the Russian government turned its full attention to the
Russification of the Baltic provinces in the 1880s that the nobility and
peasantry were drawn together, thus forming for the first time a sense of
national consciousness. 7 National awareness grew among the native Estonian
and Latvian populations as German pastors advocated economic and cultural
reforms designed to improve the lives of the peasants, and it continued to grow
as the peasantry cut its ties to the land and moved to larger urban areas.'8
National awareness was also fostered through religion. In an effort to increase
its membership, the Russian Orthodox Church began to write many of its
publications in Estonian and Latvian; this increase in native-language
publications provided education in native languages, thus drastically reducing
illiteracy almost to the point of elimination. 9 National awareness in Estonia
and Latvia was also fostered by increasing identification of folk culture.2 0 "As
the identification of folk culture with national particularity originated in the
Baltic area and drew upon Baltic material, it was natural that this should be a
vital concept for the Baltic national movements."'"
A similar development of national awareness occurred in Lithuania.
Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania experienced some degree of national
awareness before Russian domination." In an effort to crush these nationalist
stirrings, the Russian government reacted strongly by banning the publication
of Latin alphabet books in Lithuanian in 1865 and intensifying Russification
measures. 3 The increased Russification efforts had exactly the opposite effect

16. Hanneman, supranote 6, at 488.
17. Id. See also White, supra note 8, at 19.
18. Hanneman, supranote 6, at 488.
19. Id.at 488-89.
20. White, supra note 8, at 20. The Germans supplied a great deal of the "intellectual underpinnings"
of the Baltic national movements. Id at 19. For example, J.G. Herder expanded upon the ideas of Immanuel
Kant, suggesting that the "traditional artistic creation of the common people was imbued with specific
characteristics of the nation to which it belonged." Id. at 20. Through his theoretical writings, Herder
attached a new significance to folk culture; additionally, he also "initiated the collection of folk-songs by
making a compilation which included Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian material." Id.
21. Id.
22. Hanneman, supra note 6, at 489.
23. Id. The ban on the use of the Roman alphabet was especially traumatic for many Lithuanians
because "the use of the Roman alphabet was something which distinguished the Catholic Lithuanians from
the Orthodox Russians." White, supranote 8, at 24.
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on the Lithuanian population; the Lithuanian nationalist movement was instead
fostered by resistance to Russian policies.24
Emerging national awareness coupled with political unrest in the Russian
Empire provided the ideal catalyst to spark the early twentieth-century
liberation movements that would end in Baltic independence. As Russia
became increasingly embroiled in the political conflicts of the 1905
Revolution, the Baltic States were quick to respond; strikes, both industrial and
agricultural, spread rapidly throughout the region. 5 Labor strikes were not the
only form of resistance offered by the Baltic States. The examples are
numerous:
Calls for freedom of the press and universal suffrage led to
the formation of national assemblies that advocated group
autonomy. "Liberation" demonstrations targeted German
nobles and clergymen in Estonia and Latvia; protesters
burned German houses and assassinated individuals who
spoke German. In Lithuania, less dramatic uprisings were
directed at Russian schoolteachers and clergy. The Lithuanian
National Congress called for "autonomy, a centralized
administration for the ethnic Lithuanian region ... and the
use of the Lithuania language in administration."'26
Meanwhile, amidst the inner political turmoil, Russia was fighting a much
larger political battle as well: World War I. The combination of these two
struggles proved too much for Russia but provided the perfect opportunity for
the Baltic States to seek the independence they desired.
B. Independence Gainedand Lost
Following the end of World War I, the Baltic States declared their
independence one by one, demonstrating the sentiments of national awareness
that had been stirring within the nations. Lithuania was the first to declare
itself an independent republic; on February 16, 1918, a twenty-member council

24. Hanneman, supra note 6. at 489.
25. White, supra note 8, at 30. On January 9, 1905, Russian troops opened fire on peaceful
demonstrators in St. Petersburg. Id. at 29.
26. Hanneman, supra note 6, at 489.
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declared Lithuania an independent state."' Estonia followed suit, establishing
the Republic of Estonia on February 24-25, 1918, by a declaration of the
Provisional Council (Maapaev).n The Latvian National Council proclaimed
the independence of Latvia in November 1918."
This newfound independence, although long awaited, was not to be long
lasting. The Baltic States retained their independence for only twenty years,
from 1920-1940.3o However, during those years, Baltic national consciousness
flourished as the three states embarked upon the challenge of building their
nations. In an effort to secure their continuing independence, each of the three
states concluded peace treaties with the Soviet Union, which agreed to
renounce any claims (past or future) to the region." Each established a
democratic constitution, a "bill of rights" designed to guarantee individual
civil rights, and each state afforded ethnic minorities a great deal of political
participation. 2 This regard for minority concerns, like Baltic independence,
did not last long. World tensions transformed the democratic regimes into
authoritarian governments, concerned with developing well-defined national
cultures.3
The political chaos caused by World War I enabled the Baltic States to
declare their independence. Ironically, however, it was political chaos
associated with the next world war that once again cost them their sovereignty.
As World War II approached, the Baltic States were unable to engage in a
collective security agreement because Soviet and German political strategies
pitted the states against one another and ultimately fractured the Baltic
entente."' Meanwhile, as Baltic political cohesion splintered, both Stalin and
Hitler watched eagerly, each preparing his own plan for the Baltic region.
Stalin sought control of the warm-water port of Riga (located in Latvia) and
began military mobilization along the Estonian and Latvian borders to

27.
28.
29.
30.

White, supranote 8, at 33.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33.
Nicholas Hope, Inlerwvar Statehood: Symbol and Reality, in THE BALTIC STATES: THE NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA, supranote 8, at 4 1.
31. Hannemann, supranote 6, at 490.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 491. The Baltic States may have been able to set aside their suspicions of one another "had
not the trio been wedged between Russia and Germany during a period when, in the delicate language of
a British Foreign Office Official, 'both these great neighbours had succumbed to unprincipled regimes."'
David Kirby, Incorporation: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in THE BALTIC STATES: THE NATIONAL SELFDETERMINATION OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA, supra note 8, at 69, 69-70.
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accomplish this end." Stalin also sought control of the Baltic States because
they comprised an important and potentially vulnerable frontier zone. 6 Hitler
annexed the Memel portion of Lithuania in 1939.17

This continued

interference from both Germany and the Soviet Union culminated in a secret
protocol to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which provided the USSR with
control of the Baltic States." The Soviets retained control of the Baltic States
until two years later when German troops invaded the region to "liberate" the
Baltics. 39 "Liberation" occurred again in 1944 when Soviet troops returned to
"free" the Baltics from German control.'
Following annexation, the Soviets next faced the challenge of fully
integrating the Baltic States into the USSR. One of the main obstacles faced
by the USSR was suppression of the tides of national awareness. 4' Russian
linguistic terms were forcibly incorporated into native languages, and history
books were rewritten to emphasize the glory of Russia's past relations with the
Baltic States.4 The USSR deported thousands of Baltic political, public, and
religious figures of the independence period.43 These repressive measures,
however, did not achieve their goal and were in fact counterproductive."
Those fighting for liberation did not give up their struggles; they instead
continued the movement underground. 5
C. Independence Regained
National awareness did not surface publicly again until, under the
leadership of Gorbachev, the USSR embarked upon a policy of openness
(commonly known as glasnost).' It was within this period of openness that

35. Hanneman, supra note 6, at 491.
36. Kirby, supra note 34, at 70.
37. Hanneman, supra note 6,at 491.

38. Id.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 493-94.
Aleksandras Shtromas, The Baltic States as Soviet Republics: Tensions and Contradictions, in THE

BALTIC STATES:

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LrrHuANtA, supra note

8, at 86, 86-87. "It is estimated that Soviet repression and evacuations to the USSR in 1940-41 cost
Lithuania 39,000, Latvia 35,000, and Estonia (where Soviet forces stayed the longest and some conscription
into the Red Army was effected) 61,000 citizens." Id. at 87.
44. Id.at 87.
45. Hanneman, supra note 6, at 494.
46. Id.
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national identity once again blossomed and eventually led to the liberation of
the Baltic States from Soviet control. The threat of ecological damage forced
the Baltic States to revive their struggles for independence."' This threat,
combined with years of Soviet oppression, led the Baltic peoples to feel "that
their national existence was at stake. '4
Two occurrences prompted the Baltic States to make demands for their
independence: the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the 1988
publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.49 Following the publication of
the Pact, even the USSR recognized that the Baltic States had been forced into
the Soviet Union. 0 Bolstered by international support, the Baltic States
initiated a referendum to decide the question of independence; the population
voted overwhelmingly in favor of freeing themselves from Soviet control.'
In 1991, the USSR moved quickly to squelch nationalist movements, initiating
"a violent crackdown" in Latvia and Lithuania.52 However, under the pressure
of Western disapproval, Gorbachev reluctantly agreed to grant the Baltic
republics independence. 3 On September 6, 1991, Gorbachev and the leaders
of the Union of Sovereign States formally recognized the independence of the
Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were granted membership in the
United Nations on September 17, 1991.'4

47. Id. at 494-95. In Estonia, the "Panda incident" is credited with the resurgence of national
awareness. A popular nature program entitled "Panda" broadcast the news that the USSR intended to
expand phosphorate mining, which caused extreme damage to the environment of Estonia as well as to the
environments of the other two Baltic States. Protestors from all walks of Estonian life joined together to
fight mining expansion. Latvia's national awareness was similarly revived by an ecological threat. The
USSR intended to construct a hydroelectric plant on the Daugava river; the plant would have caused
environmental harm and would have destroyed several Latvian cultural landmarks. Finally, in Lithuania,
the proposed expansion of the Ignalina nuclear plant, which was modeled after the one located at Chernobyl,
was the catalyst that once again awoke nationalist stirrings in the Lithuanian people. Id.
48. Id. at 495.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Seventy-eight percent of Estonians supported independence, seventy-four percent of Latvians
favored independence, and ninety percent of Lithuanians agreed that the Baltic States should separate
themselves from the USSR. Id.at 495-96.
52. Id. at 496.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 496-97.
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II.APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

With newly established independence came many opportunities and
challenges. Numerous problems continue to confront the Baltic States on their
individual and shared roads to international political and economic integration.
To begin with, each of the three countries is small and therefore cannot easily
impose its will on larger political actors." The Baltic countries must also
address additional problems:
The position of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is complicated
by two additional factors: 1) The Baltic countries are
newcomers on the political stage, and their freedom of action
is directly proportional to the duration of their existence; 2) In
1991 the Baltic countries were not only dependent, but their
dependence (economic and political) was concentrated only
on one participant in international politics-Russia. This
situation could be described as unilateral independence. 6
Because of their relative lack of political power and potential unilateral
independence, the Baltic States have made overcoming this dependence one
of their major political objectives. 7 All three of the nations have focused on
converting unilateral dependence into pluralistic dependence, "so that
dependence [is] not concentrated only on one actor on the international
scene." ' In an effort to achieve this pluralistic dependence, each of the Baltic
States is currently seeking membership in the European Union.59 Membership
in the EU will certainly provide the Baltic States with the necessary economic
and political support that they seek. In order to become members of the EU,
however, the Baltic States will be expected to bring their foreign and domestic

55. Andris Ozolins, The Policiesof the Baltic Countries Vis-d-Vis the CSCE, NATO and WEU, in THE
FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES: BASIC ISSUES 49, 50 (Pertti Joenniemi & Juris Prikulis eds.,
1994).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The Baltic States have also applied for membership in several other multinational political
organizations. Id.at 54-67. All three nations were granted membership in the CSCE on September 10,
1991, and all three have also sought membership in NATO and have not been accorded, but are quite
unlikely to be accorded, membership status. Id.
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policies in line with those of the EU. One such policy that will have to be
modified, or in some cases developed, to comply with that of the EU is
immigration and asylum policy.
A. ProposedBaltic State Membership in the European Union
The Baltic States' applications for EU membership were preceded by
several other Baltic-EU agreements. The Baltic States gained Most Favored
Nation status in May 1992, when each of the three states signed trade and
cooperation agreements with the European Community (EC). ° Baltic foreign
ministers were hopeful that the signing of these documents was indicative of
events to come; they "expressed the hope that after this first step, a further
step-associate membership in the European Community-would follow,
resulting later in full membership in the EU."' It was not until 1994 that it
began to seem as if the Baltic States' wishes might in fact be realized. On
October 25, 1994, the Commission adopted a communication stating that the
EU recognizes the need to develop relations with the Baltic region. The
Communication stated:
[T]he forthcoming enlargement of the European Union and
the move towards closer relations with the countries of the
Baltic create a need for an overall Union policy for that
region. In the light of the latter's status as an important
market and a major centre of economic activity, the greatest
advantage to both sides would come from integrating the
Baltic into the world and European economies as far as
possible.62
At the same time, the EU Commission also set forth a policy paper
advocating deeper ties with the Baltic States.63 In this policy paper, the EU
Commission once again examined the importance of the Baltic Sea region to

60. Juris Prikulis, The European Policies of the Baltic Countries, in THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE
BALTIC CouNTlUEs: BASIC ISsuES, supra note 55, at 87, 94.
61. Id. at 95. Residents of the Baltic States also longed for EU membership. According to 1991
opinion polls, 88% of Lithuanians, 80% of Estonians, and 78% of Latvians supported EU membership. Id
62. BULLETIN, supra note 5, at 1.3.21.
63. Commission Launches Global Policy for the Baltics, RAPID, Oct. 26, 1994, availablein LEXIS,
World Library, RAPID file.
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Europe." The paper reiterated the view that the EU would be best served by
integration of the Baltic States into the European economy because so many
EU citizens resided in the Baltic States." The Commission also noted in this
paper that the EU had an "abiding interest" in "setting up machinery for the
processing of asylum applications and for combating illegal immigration."
The foreign ministers of all three Baltic nations welcomed the EU's
decision to negotiate with the Baltic States. 7 These negotiations eventually
resulted in the drafting of Europe Association Agreements with Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania." Leaders who gave speeches at the signing ceremony
stated that "[a]fter many years apart, [the] moment symbolized the return of the
Baltic States to the European family." 9 They did not, however, provide for the
immediate return of the Baltic States to the "European family." The
Agreements established transitional periods for both Latvia and Lithuania;
however, because of Estonia's greater degree of development, no transitional
period was established for the nation. 0
Plans for the Baltic States to join the EU continue to move forward. In
April 1996, the European Commission approved yet another EU initiative
designed to improve both economic and political stability in the Baltic States.'
"The Commission's new initiative covers activities as diverse as improving
direct contracts between public and private institutions, protecting minority
rights, exchanging information in the fight against organized crime and
developing legislative and administrative systems in matters of asylum and the
prevention of illegal immigration." ' As the situation currently stands, the
Baltic States will probably become members of the EU during the first-wave
enlargement after 2000."

64. Id.
65. Id. At the time the Commission released the policy paper, some I I million residents of the Baltic
Sea region were EU citizens. Id
66. Id.
67. Baltic Foreign Ministers Welcome EU Mandate, Discuss Border Issues, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
68. Signing ofthe Europe Association Agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, RAPID, June
12, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, RAPID File. The Agreements were signed in Luxembourg
on June 12, 1995. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. EU/Baltic Region - The Commission Adopts a New Initiative, Agence Europe, April 11, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
72. Id.
73. John Palmer, EU Urged to Take in States Left Out by NATO, THE GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 25,
1996, at 8, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File. The Clinton administration has urged the
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B. Immigration and Asylum Policy of the European Union
When the Baltic States achieve full membership status in the EU, it will
be essential for the states' foreign and domestic policy to coincide with the
objectives and policies of the EU. Perhaps one of the more controversial
policy areas of the EU concerns immigration and asylum procedures. In
addition to their controversial nature, the policies are quite complex.
However, in order to examine the changes the Baltic States must make in their
own policies, it is necessary to first examine the basic development of EU
immigration and asylum policy.
The development of workable immigration and asylum policies is essential
for the continued progression of the European Union.74 "Just as free
movement and equal treatment were of crucial importance for the development
of the European Community, so common policies on immigration and asylum
are indispensable for the deepening of the European Union."" An examination
provides the background information necessary to understand the emerging
policy of today's EU and the challenges faced by it.
Immigration and asylum became important political issues for individual
countries as well as for the European Community during the 1980s."' The
Community determined that these issues would be best addressed through
intergovernmental cooperation and developed a cooperative method to regulate
immigration and asylum procedures." The choice of intergovernmental
cooperation as the means to address immigration and asylum issues is very
significant. Intergovernmental cooperation, unlike a supranational authority,
does not compromise state sovereignty. The EC Treaty does not impart upon
European institutions a clear directive to enact legislation on immigration and

EU to include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the first-wave enlargement after 2000 because the Baltic
States' applications to NATO have been "put on ice" due to Russian opposition. Id
74. Jan Niessen, The European Union's Migration and Asylum Policies, Introduction, in THE
DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ADOPTED CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, DECISIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 3,4 (Elspeth Guild ed., 1996).

75. Id. The many different names that refer to European political organizations are potentially
confusing. For purposes of this note, the distinction set forth by Niessen will be followed. According to
Niessen, the term "European Community" refers to the European Economic Community, established by the
Treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957). This name was then changed to European Community by the
1991 Treaty on European Union. Niessen uses the term "European Union" to refer to the Union as it was
established by the Treaty on European Union. Id.at 3 n. 1.
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id.
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asylum matters."s Immigration and asylum matters are addressed within "the
framework of cooperation on justice and home affairs," more commonly
known as the third pillar."
Because immigrationi and asylum policies fall within the third pillar, the
European Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over these matters, and the role
of the European Parliament is correspondingly weak.' For example, although
the EC has the authority to draft legislation regarding EC citizens, the EC
Treaty does not confer this same authority regarding legislation addressing
immigration and asylum of non-EC nationals; therefore, control of third-party
immigration has traditionally been a matter left to the individual member
states." However, in an effort to provide some degree of common policy, "a
limited mandate has been developed to promote equality of treatment of the
approximately ten million third-country nationals...
The Commission issued two communications designed to address
immigration and asylum issues in 1991. The communication on asylum stated
that asylum regulation measures should reflect a respect for human rights. It
also addressed two major components of the asylum debate: the prevention of
abuse of asylum procedures and the development of a common asylum
machinery. 3 Additionally, the Commission addressed the four major
immigration problems confronting the member states in its communication on
immigration. These problems were identified as: 1) abuse of asylum
procedures; 2) managing the effects of migration pressure; 3) controlling
immigration flow; and 4) integrating legally-admitted immigrants."
The
Commission once again addressed these issues in its 1994 Communication on
Immigration and Asylum Policies, and it also proposed recommended action
by the Union. 5 "By and large, this Communication was an elaborated and

78. Id. at 11.
79. Id. at 4.
80. Id. at 47-48.
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. Equality of treatment is to be achieved through the implementation of Association and
Cooperation Agreements between the Community and third countries. Id
83. Id. at 16.
84. Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration (SEC
(91) 1855 final) and Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the Right of Asylum (SEC (91) 1857 final) in THE DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 74, at 16.
85. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM(94)23 final at II, in THE
DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OFTHE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 74, at 17.
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integrated version of the Commission's two 1991 communications on
immigration and asylum. 86
There has been a significant amount of cooperation among meipber states.
For example, in 1986, the Ad-hoc Group on Immigration was formed to
coordinate immigration and asylum policies among member states." The texts
of several conventions aimed at establishing a workable immigration and
asylum policy have also been adopted by immigration ministers of member
countries. The text of the Dublin Convention, adopted by ten of the twelve
original member states, makes each state responsible for examining asylum
applications made in one of the member states so that, in theory, applicants for
asylum are not shuttled from state to state for application processing."
Additionally, the Convention is intended to prevent applicants from applying
for asylum in more than one member country. 9

It was not until 1992 that the European Council promulgated and adopted
the Declaration on Principles Governing External Aspects of Migration Policy.
This Declaration included the following principles:
1. the preservation and restoration of peace, and full respect
for human rights and the rule of law, which would diminish
migratory movements resulting from war and oppressive
regimes;
2. the protection and assistance of displaced people in the
nearest safe area to their homes;
3. the promotion of liberal trade and economic cooperation
with countries of emigration, which would reduce economic
motives for migration;
4. targeting development aid and job creation, and the
alleviation of poverty;

86. Niessen, supra note 74, at 17.
87. Id. at 31. Several other intergovernmental groups were also established, including the Rhodes
European Council, which was responsible for setting up free movement of people. Id. at 32.
88. Id. at 34. Only Ireland and the Netherlands have not yet ratified the Convention. The Convention
will not enter into force until after the initial twelve member states have ratified it. Sweden, Austria, and
Finland, the three newest EU members, have yet to sign the Convention as well. Id.
89. Id.
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5. efforts to combat illegal immigration;
6. the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements with
countries of origin or transit, to ensure that illegal immigrants
were returned to their home countries;
7. the assessment of home countries' practices in readmitting
their nationals after they are expelled from the territories of
the member states, and
8. the increase in cooperation in responding to the particular
challenge of persons fleeing from armed conflict and
persecution in former Yugoslavia.'
The 1993 Treaty on European Union, which established the EU as it
currently exists, slightly expanded the EU's potential authority to determine
immigration policy.9 However, as of yet, immigration and asylum control
measures currently remain issues controlled by intergovernmental
cooperation.' As such, a harmonized system of common policy has yet to be
developed.93 According to one author, "[t]he European Union's efforts to
design common policies in the fields of migration, asylum and integration are
without vision or direction. Moreover, the way in which policies are being
shaped lack transparency and efficiency, and suffer from insufficient

90. ELSPETH GUILD & JAN NIESSEN, THE DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 46-7 (1996) (citing European Council in Edinburgh., Conclusion of the Presidency, in
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN COUNCILS, CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY 1992-1994 46-47
(1995).
91. Id. at 49. Article K.9 of the Treaty on European Union opens the door to the possibility that
matters of immigration and asylum control may become policies increasingly under the EU's control. Id.
at 49-50.
92. Id. at 50. EU member states continue to guard their sovereignty, and, therefore, have consented
only to work intergovemmentally on immigration and asylum issues. Id at 19. See also supra notes 77-82
and accompanying text.
93. Immigration and asylum issues fall within the third pillar and, as such, are subject to the
recommendations of the Justice and Home Affairs Councils. Id at 53. However, because third pillar issues
are addressed only through intergovernmental cooperation efforts, the recommendations of the Council are
not binding, and the Court of Justice has no competence. Id.at 47-48. The Council has adopted one joint
action in the immigration and asylum area which permits pupils to travel visa-free throughout the EU. Id.
at 54. It has yet to propose to the member states any conventions addressing immigration and asylum issues.
Id. In 1995, however, the Council did adopt a resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum seekers, which
contained a statement of asylum seekers' rights as well as a statement of appeal and review procedures. Id
at 56.
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parliamentary and judicial control? ' The question of whether the current EU
approach to these issues is effective and fair remains open. Regardless of the
uncertain answer to this question, asylum policy and immigration control
continue to remain two of the most pressing issues currently faced by the EU.

Ill. MODIFICATION OF BALTIC STATE IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES

As the Baltic States prepare for eventual member status in the EU, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania must all begin to align their own foreign policies with
those observed by the EU. Because the EU does not have comprehensive
immigration and asylum policies that are recognized equally by all of its
member states, this task will be a very difficult one for the three hopeful
member states to accomplish. At the very least, several key issues must be
addressed by the Baltic States in their preparations for EU membership. For
instance, will current immigration and asylum policies be sufficiently
compatible with EU guidelines? If not, what changes will need to be made?
Finally, if such changes are made, will these changes violate the constitutions
of the three Baltic Nations?
A. The Question of Compatibility: Will Existing Laws and Policy be
Sufficient?
1. The Effects of Past ImmigrationExperiences on Current
Immigration Policy
Baltic history has played an instrumental role in the development of
today's citizenship and immigration laws. In order to better understand the
policies underlying Baltic immigration and asylum procedures, it is first
necessary to examine the historical threat of immigration. The inextricable tie
of citizenship to immigration has been a central issue for all three states since
the inception of the independence movements.9 5 Throughout Soviet
occupation of the Baltic States," Estonia and Latvia were subject to a greater

94. Id. at 60.
95. Graham Smith et al., Statehood, Ethnic Relations and Citizenship, in THE BALTIC STATES: THE
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHuANIA, supra note 8, at 181, 182
[hereinafter Smith et al.].
96. See generally supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (explaining the period of Soviet
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influx of immigrants than was Lithuania.' The marked declines in ethnic
populations that resulted from Soviet occupation led the ethnic populations of
the Baltic States, especially Estonians and Latvians, to feel as if they were
becoming minorities in their own states. Accordingly, after the states declared
their independence from the Soviet Union, these fears were reflected in newly
drafted citizenship laws.
Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws were based on policies of exclusion
rather than inclusion. The nationalism that emerged in these two countries was
"a form of nationalism based on ethnic or primordial ties and which stressed
the exclusivist and symbiotic relationship between the core nation, homeland,
and citizenship."" s In fact, many Latvian residents were so frightened of
"national extinction" that Latvian politicians supported the introduction of
quotas designed to dissuade immigration? Estonia's citizenship law suggests
a similar distaste for immigrants.'"
In contrast, Lithuania did not experience a tremendous influx of
immigrants during Soviet occupation. Therefore, its citizenship laws were
based on a policy of inclusion rather than upon one of exclusion.'"' The
Lithuanian law based citizenship conditions on territorial, not primordial,
factors. It was designed to foster a sense of national self-determination."2
These countries' experiences with immigration cannot simply be considered
historic relics of an age now passed; they continue to affect the Baltic States
and have undoubtedly played at least some role in the formation of current
immigration and asylum policies.

occupation of the Baltic States).
97. Smith et al., supra note 95, at 182. The Latvian share of its population decreased from 75.5% in
1939 to a mere 51.8% in 1989. Estonia experienced an ever greater decline, from 90%/6 in 1939 to only
64.7% 50 years later. Lithuania did not experience such a decline; its population remained 80% ethnic
Lithuanian. Id.
98. Id. at 184.
99. Id. at 185-86. The priority list for Latvian citizenship was as follows: 1) ethnic Latvians without
citizenship, 2) spouses and children of citizens and those who made significant contributions to Latvian
at 186.
independence, and, finally, 3) ethnic Russians. Id.
100. See generally Smith et al., supra note 95, at 184-89 (providing an explanation of the conflict
between the traditions of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism in Estonia and Latvia). It should also be
noted here that these citizenship laws are quite controversial because of their effect on ethnic Russians who
migrated to the Baltic States during the period of Soviet occupation. Baits view these Russians as illegal
immigrants. Russia: Russian Duma Urges Economic Sanctions of Latvia, Reuter Textline, Reuter News
Service - CIS and Eastern Europe, Oct. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
101. Smith et al., supra note 95, at 183.
102. See id.
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2. Examples of CurrentImmigration andAsylum Laws' 3
The Baltic States do not currently have a unified immigration and asylum
policy. Each of the three countries has developed its own unique set of
standards and regulations which differ in content and degree of development.
For example, Lithuania is currently the only Baltic State with an asylum law
designed to govern the treatment of those seeking political refuge.' ° However,
according to Interior Ministry officials, the law cannot be implemented
because of economic conditions; Lithuania simply cannot afford to provide
food and shelter for the flood of immigrants and refugees destined for
Scandinavia."° Latvia is being compelled to address asylum policies. The
Prime Minister has recently ordered the Interior Minister to develop a new law
on refugee policy. Without this law it is extremely difficult to make proper
and consistent decisions regarding who should be considered an illegal
immigrant and who should be considered a refugee."
In addition to its refugee law, Lithuania has a comprehensive law on
immigration that describes in detail the conditions and procedures for entry
into the country."°c The law explains the rights of foreigners wishing to
immigrate to Lithuania, and it sets forth reasons that may prohibit
immigration."~ It also provides authority for the Supreme Council of the
Republic of Lithuania to establish immigration quotas."°
The Seimas
(Parliament) exercised this power in 1995 by setting an immigration quota
which permitted only 2,500 foreigners to immigrate to Lithuania in 1996. The
quota gave priority to those immigrating from countries with which Lithuania
has concluded international agreements and to citizens of EU states." 0

103. This subsection is intended to provide only a few examples of the various immigration and
asylum laws of the Baltic States. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive accounting of these laws.
104. Lithuania Struggles to Cope With Immigrant Flood, Reuter North American Wire, Nov. 17,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
105. Id.
106. Latvian Press Digest, Reuter Textline, Reuter News Service - CIS and Eastern Europe, July 18,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File.
107. Law on Immigration, art. I (1991XLith.), in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL
MATERIALS, Lithuania § 4, 3 (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1997).
108. Law on Immigration, art. 5 (1991XLith.), in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL
MATERIALS, supra note 107, § 4, 4. Article 5 of the Law on Immigration lists several reasons why a person
may be denied an immigration permit. Among them are affliction with a dangerous contagious disease,
mental retardation or mental illness, drug or alcohol addiction, and commission of a serious crime within
five years preceding the application, to name a few. Id
109. Id.at art. 6, §4, 5.
110. Lithuania Immigration Quotas Set by Parliament, Reuter Textline - BBC Monitoring Service:
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3. Does CurrentImmigrationandAsylum Policy Adequately
Address the ProblemsFaced by the Baltic States?
As with many other countries, the Baltic nations face the problem of
illegal immigration. Combating the flow of persons using the Baltic States as
transit routes to other nations such as Sweden has proved a costly venture.
Furthermore, each of the Baltic States must deal with the problem of securing
its international borders. Lithuania in particular has experienced a great deal
of trouble trying to stop the flow of immigrants pouring through its Polish and
Byelorussian borders."' These borders are especially difficult for Lithuania
to control because "[t]he economic and political position of Lithuania's
southern and eastern neighbors is unstable, and, it appears, not headed for
rapid stabilization.""' From January until November 1996, Lithuanian Border
Guard officers captured roughly 380 illegal immigrants, mostly Asian, on the
Polish-Lithuanian border." 3 According to Stanislovas Stancikas, Chief
Commissioner and head of the Lithuanian Border Protection Service, in 1995,
nearly 333,000 illegal immigrants from Belarus intended to reach Western
4
countries through Lithuania and Poland."
Do the current immigration and asylum laws adequately address these
issues? One incident in particular seems to suggest that they do not. On
March 28, 1995, Lithuanian border police stopped a passenger train carrying
immigrants just inside the border with Latvia."5 The group, which had been
shuttled back and forth among Russia, Latvia, and Lithuania, was repeatedly
refused permission to disembark in Latvia." 6 The 105 Middle Eastern
refugees, who had originally intended to seek asylum in Sweden, were
stranded on the train for more than a week while Latvia and Lithuania argued
about which country should provide them asylum." 7 Latvian officials viewed

CIS, Dec. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTEE File.
S111.Olga Zhuryari et al., Echo of the Versailles Peace Treaty? Border Problems of the Baltic
Countries, 1920-1993, in THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE BALTIC CoUNTRIES: BASIC IssuEs, supra note 55
at 115, 125.
112. Id.
113. Group of Illegal Entrants Detained on Polish-LithuanianBorder, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 23, 1996, availablein LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
114. Lithuania Welcomes Russian Aim of Boosting BelarusianBorder Controls, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Oct. 2,1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
115. Andrew Huddart, Refugees on Train of Despair Stuck at Baltic Border, Reuters World Service,
March 31, 1995, availablein LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
116. Id.
117. Andrew Huddart, Latvia Faces Dilemmaon Mideast Refugee Train, Reuters World Service, Mar.
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the group as illegal immigrants using Latvia as a transit country and therefore
refused the refugees entry. At a news conference the head of Latvia's Interior
Ministry Police explained that the country would not admit the refugees for
fear of a "crash"; he felt that giving this group asylum would transform the
country into a transit zone for refugees and would force the creation of an
Asian quarter in the country's capital."' Meanwhile, as Latvia and Lithuania
argued about which country would take the refugees, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that the refugees, who were
being "treated like cattle" on a "train of despair," should be permitted to seek
asylum in the Baltic region. "9
This incident, although not routine, seems to suggest that current
immigration and asylum procedures in the Baltic States are not functioning
properly. The lack of a cohesive policy will continue to lead to incidents like
the "Train of Despair" where refugees are stranded as the Baltic governments
argue over who will take them. Furthermore, the tide of illegal immigrants
crossing Baltic borders has not decreased and the numbers are certain to
continue their upward climb. Unless the Baltic States work together to
develop cooperative immigration and asylum policies, the current chaos will
continue.
B. Moving Closer to EU Membership: Necessary Changes in Immigration
and Asylum Policy
As the Baltic States continue on their journeys to full European Union
membership, they must not only develop more effective immigration and
asylum policies but must also develop policies that reflect the accepted
principles governing EU immigration. Western European asylum policies can
be roughly divided into two stages. 2 "The first phase was marked by
uncoordinated national policies designed to restrict the number of asylumseekers and to discourage applicants from requesting asylum." 2 ' Unilateral
measures transferred refugee problems from one state to another, leading to the

31, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bernhard Santel, Loss ofControl: The Build-up ofa European Migration and Asylum Regime,
in MIGRATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE DYNAMics OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 75.82 (Robert
Miles & Dietrich Thrlhardt eds., 1995).
121. Id.
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problem of "refugees in orbit, 'those unwanted asylum-seekers who are
bounced back and forth between countries like shuttlecocks.""' The second
phase was marked by the introduction of a coordinated and integrated
European asylum policy designed to alleviate the problems caused by
unilateral management and to prepare for the abolition of border controls
between EU member states." Baltic immigration and asylum policy currently
corresponds with the first phase of EU policymaking. If the Baltic States are
going to be prepared for full EU membership, it is essential that they "catch
up" by developing a coordinated and integrated immigration and asylum
policy.
The Baltic States have already taken several steps to move them closer to
a unified policy. The Baltic Council of Ministers agreed in October 1996 to
establish a committee on immigration issues.'24 The Baltic States have also
initiated measures designed to develop a common policy for dealing with
illegal immigration. In an unofficial meeting between Lithuanian President
Algirdas

Brazauskas

and

Latvian

President

Guntis

Ulmanis,

illegal

immigration was identified as one of the most important issues affecting
relations between the two countries.'25 "Speaking about the problems of illegal
immigration, Brazauskas said: 'We agreed that talks about illegal immigrants
should proceed much more rapidly. We should sign a so-called readmission
agreement, or a treaty (to this effect), which would outline mutual
commitments in respect of illegal immigrants.""' 26 Such a treaty has been
signed; at a June 30, 1995 meeting, Baltic leaders approved a treaty governing
repatriation of illegal immigrants.'2 These changes have undoubtedly aided
in developing a common policy; however, they alone are not enough.

The

Baltic States must continue to improve immigration and asylum policies
through cooperation and collective policy.

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Baltic Immigration Authorities Propose Forming Joint Committee, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Oct. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
125. President Brazauskas Reviews Talks with Latvian Leaders, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
May 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
126. Id.
127. Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Prime Ministers Confer in Vilnius, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, July 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
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C. Will Changes in Immigration and Asylum Policy Comport with
ConstitutionalPrinciples?
EU membership will provide the Baltic States with many political and
economic advantages. However, modification of Baltic immigration and
asylum policy so that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may become EU members
may in fact provide one significant disadvantage: these changes potentially
violate constitutional principles.
Lithuanian law provides the clearest example of this potential danger.
Article 21 of the Lithuanian Constitution provides: "The person shall be
inviolable. Human dignity shall be protected by law. It shall be prohibited to
torture, injure, degrade, or maltreat a person, as well as to establish such
punishments."' 28 By developing its immigration and asylum policy to reflect
that of the EU, Lithuania may violate this provision of its Constitution. The
Europe Association Agreement between the EU and Lithuania reaffirms the
importance placed on respect for human rights. 29 Arguably, the EU asylum
policy does not place a great deal of emphasis on the dignity of human rights.
"The bottom line-a conclusion shared by most independent legal
commentators-is that the two arrangements [the Dublin Convention and the
Schengen Agreement] in effect severely restrict the access of asylum-seekers
to a fair hearing of their case, and are in contradiction of the 1951 Geneva
Refugee Convention."' 30
Returning a refugee to a country where he will face political persecution
or even bodily harm can be characterized as an injury that violates the dignity
and the person of the refugee. By modeling its asylum policy after EU policy,
Lithuania may violate this constitutional provision. Similarly, Article 135 of
the Lithuanian Constitution might also be violated by a harmonization of
Lithuanian and EU immigration and asylum policies. The Article states:

128. LITH. CONST., art. 21, in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 107,

§ 1,6.
129. Signing of the Europe Association Agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, supra note
68.
130. Henk Overbeek, Towards a New International Migration Regime: Globalization, Migration and
the Internationalizationof the State, in MIGRATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE DYNAMICS OF

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION, supra note 120, at 15, 31. All EU member countries have signed the Geneva
Convention, a provision that guarantees that no one seeking refuge will be returned to her or his home
country if she or he might face persecution there. Santel, supra note 120, at 80.
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In conducting foreign policy, the Republic of Lithuania shall
pursue the universally recognized principles and norms of
international law, shall strive to safeguard national security
and independence as well as the basic rights, freedoms and
welfare of its citizens, and shall take part in the creation of
sound international order based on law and justice. 3 I
Disregard of the Geneva Convention, which set forth universally recognized
principles of the rights of refugees, would violate this constitutional provision
as well.
The development of an immigration and asylum policy that reflects and
coincides with EU principles will indeed be a very difficult task for the Baltic
States to achieve. The level of difficulty, at least in the case of Lithuania, may
be complicated by the additional requirement that these newly developed
policies comport with constitutional provisions. Membership in the European
Union will provide Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with many positive benefits.
However, the road to member status is not free of obstacles.
CONCLUSION

Full integration into the European economic and political communities is
essential for the Baltic States' continued growth as independent nations. In
order to accomplish this goal, the Baltic States have turned to the European
Union for assistance. Member status in the EU will undoubtedly provide the
Baltic States with much needed economic and political support. Membership,
however, does have its price. To prepare for membership, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania must develop economic and foreign policies that correspond with
those of the EU.
As global immigration increasingly becomes a reality, creation of an
immigration and asylum policy that corresponds to principles embraced by the
EU is a challenge to which the Baltic States must rise. Several steps in the
correct direction, such as the establishment of a committee designed to
coordinate the three countries' efforts to combat illegal immigration and the
development (or pending development) of asylum laws, have already been
taken. However, at the same time, these states must avoid the lurking danger

131. LITH. CONST.,

§ 1,37.

art.

135, in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note

108,
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of creating or adhering to policies that may violate their own constitutions.
Achievement of these goals will enable the Baltic States to make an easier
transition into the EU and will enable them to flourish as independent nations
as well.

